|  | /* | 
|  | * Intel Memory Protection Keys management | 
|  | * Copyright (c) 2015, Intel Corporation. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it | 
|  | * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License, | 
|  | * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT | 
|  | * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or | 
|  | * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License for | 
|  | * more details. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | #include <linux/debugfs.h>		/* debugfs_create_u32()		*/ | 
|  | #include <linux/mm_types.h>             /* mm_struct, vma, etc...       */ | 
|  | #include <linux/pkeys.h>                /* PKEY_*                       */ | 
|  | #include <uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h> | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include <asm/cpufeature.h>             /* boot_cpu_has, ...            */ | 
|  | #include <asm/mmu_context.h>            /* vma_pkey()                   */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm) | 
|  | { | 
|  | bool need_to_set_mm_pkey = false; | 
|  | int execute_only_pkey = mm->context.execute_only_pkey; | 
|  | int ret; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Do we need to assign a pkey for mm's execute-only maps? */ | 
|  | if (execute_only_pkey == -1) { | 
|  | /* Go allocate one to use, which might fail */ | 
|  | execute_only_pkey = mm_pkey_alloc(mm); | 
|  | if (execute_only_pkey < 0) | 
|  | return -1; | 
|  | need_to_set_mm_pkey = true; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * We do not want to go through the relatively costly | 
|  | * dance to set PKRU if we do not need to.  Check it | 
|  | * first and assume that if the execute-only pkey is | 
|  | * write-disabled that we do not have to set it | 
|  | * ourselves.  We need preempt off so that nobody | 
|  | * can make fpregs inactive. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | preempt_disable(); | 
|  | if (!need_to_set_mm_pkey && | 
|  | current->thread.fpu.initialized && | 
|  | !__pkru_allows_read(read_pkru(), execute_only_pkey)) { | 
|  | preempt_enable(); | 
|  | return execute_only_pkey; | 
|  | } | 
|  | preempt_enable(); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Set up PKRU so that it denies access for everything | 
|  | * other than execution. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | ret = arch_set_user_pkey_access(current, execute_only_pkey, | 
|  | PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS); | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * If the PKRU-set operation failed somehow, just return | 
|  | * 0 and effectively disable execute-only support. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (ret) { | 
|  | mm_set_pkey_free(mm, execute_only_pkey); | 
|  | return -1; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* We got one, store it and use it from here on out */ | 
|  | if (need_to_set_mm_pkey) | 
|  | mm->context.execute_only_pkey = execute_only_pkey; | 
|  | return execute_only_pkey; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static inline bool vma_is_pkey_exec_only(struct vm_area_struct *vma) | 
|  | { | 
|  | /* Do this check first since the vm_flags should be hot */ | 
|  | if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC)) != VM_EXEC) | 
|  | return false; | 
|  | if (vma_pkey(vma) != vma->vm_mm->context.execute_only_pkey) | 
|  | return false; | 
|  |  | 
|  | return true; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * This is only called for *plain* mprotect calls. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int prot, int pkey) | 
|  | { | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Is this an mprotect_pkey() call?  If so, never | 
|  | * override the value that came from the user. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (pkey != -1) | 
|  | return pkey; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * The mapping is execute-only.  Go try to get the | 
|  | * execute-only protection key.  If we fail to do that, | 
|  | * fall through as if we do not have execute-only | 
|  | * support in this mm. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (prot == PROT_EXEC) { | 
|  | pkey = execute_only_pkey(vma->vm_mm); | 
|  | if (pkey > 0) | 
|  | return pkey; | 
|  | } else if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma)) { | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Protections are *not* PROT_EXEC, but the mapping | 
|  | * is using the exec-only pkey.  This mapping was | 
|  | * PROT_EXEC and will no longer be.  Move back to | 
|  | * the default pkey. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | return ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * This is a vanilla, non-pkey mprotect (or we failed to | 
|  | * setup execute-only), inherit the pkey from the VMA we | 
|  | * are working on. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | return vma_pkey(vma); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | #define PKRU_AD_KEY(pkey)	(PKRU_AD_BIT << ((pkey) * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY)) | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Make the default PKRU value (at execve() time) as restrictive | 
|  | * as possible.  This ensures that any threads clone()'d early | 
|  | * in the process's lifetime will not accidentally get access | 
|  | * to data which is pkey-protected later on. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | u32 init_pkru_value = PKRU_AD_KEY( 1) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 2) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 3) | | 
|  | PKRU_AD_KEY( 4) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 5) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 6) | | 
|  | PKRU_AD_KEY( 7) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 8) | PKRU_AD_KEY( 9) | | 
|  | PKRU_AD_KEY(10) | PKRU_AD_KEY(11) | PKRU_AD_KEY(12) | | 
|  | PKRU_AD_KEY(13) | PKRU_AD_KEY(14) | PKRU_AD_KEY(15); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Called from the FPU code when creating a fresh set of FPU | 
|  | * registers.  This is called from a very specific context where | 
|  | * we know the FPU regstiers are safe for use and we can use PKRU | 
|  | * directly. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | void copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(void) | 
|  | { | 
|  | u32 init_pkru_value_snapshot = READ_ONCE(init_pkru_value); | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Any write to PKRU takes it out of the XSAVE 'init | 
|  | * state' which increases context switch cost.  Avoid | 
|  | * writing 0 when PKRU was already 0. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (!init_pkru_value_snapshot && !read_pkru()) | 
|  | return; | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Override the PKRU state that came from 'init_fpstate' | 
|  | * with the baseline from the process. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | write_pkru(init_pkru_value_snapshot); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static ssize_t init_pkru_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf, | 
|  | size_t count, loff_t *ppos) | 
|  | { | 
|  | char buf[32]; | 
|  | unsigned int len; | 
|  |  | 
|  | len = sprintf(buf, "0x%x\n", init_pkru_value); | 
|  | return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, len); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static ssize_t init_pkru_write_file(struct file *file, | 
|  | const char __user *user_buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) | 
|  | { | 
|  | char buf[32]; | 
|  | ssize_t len; | 
|  | u32 new_init_pkru; | 
|  |  | 
|  | len = min(count, sizeof(buf) - 1); | 
|  | if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, len)) | 
|  | return -EFAULT; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Make the buffer a valid string that we can not overrun */ | 
|  | buf[len] = '\0'; | 
|  | if (kstrtouint(buf, 0, &new_init_pkru)) | 
|  | return -EINVAL; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Don't allow insane settings that will blow the system | 
|  | * up immediately if someone attempts to disable access | 
|  | * or writes to pkey 0. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (new_init_pkru & (PKRU_AD_BIT|PKRU_WD_BIT)) | 
|  | return -EINVAL; | 
|  |  | 
|  | WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru); | 
|  | return count; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static const struct file_operations fops_init_pkru = { | 
|  | .read = init_pkru_read_file, | 
|  | .write = init_pkru_write_file, | 
|  | .llseek = default_llseek, | 
|  | }; | 
|  |  | 
|  | static int __init create_init_pkru_value(void) | 
|  | { | 
|  | debugfs_create_file("init_pkru", S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR, | 
|  | arch_debugfs_dir, NULL, &fops_init_pkru); | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  | late_initcall(create_init_pkru_value); | 
|  |  | 
|  | static __init int setup_init_pkru(char *opt) | 
|  | { | 
|  | u32 new_init_pkru; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (kstrtouint(opt, 0, &new_init_pkru)) | 
|  | return 1; | 
|  |  | 
|  | WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return 1; | 
|  | } | 
|  | __setup("init_pkru=", setup_init_pkru); |