| /* | |
| * linux/kernel/panic.c | |
| * | |
| * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds | |
| */ | |
| /* | |
| * This function is used through-out the kernel (including mm and fs) | |
| * to indicate a major problem. | |
| */ | |
| #include <linux/module.h> | |
| #include <linux/sched.h> | |
| #include <linux/delay.h> | |
| #include <linux/reboot.h> | |
| #include <linux/notifier.h> | |
| #include <linux/init.h> | |
| #include <linux/sysrq.h> | |
| #include <linux/interrupt.h> | |
| #include <linux/nmi.h> | |
| #include <linux/kexec.h> | |
| #include <linux/debug_locks.h> | |
| #include <linux/random.h> | |
| int panic_on_oops; | |
| int tainted; | |
| static int pause_on_oops; | |
| static int pause_on_oops_flag; | |
| static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pause_on_oops_lock); | |
| int panic_timeout; | |
| ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(panic_notifier_list); | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_notifier_list); | |
| static int __init panic_setup(char *str) | |
| { | |
| panic_timeout = simple_strtoul(str, NULL, 0); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| __setup("panic=", panic_setup); | |
| static long no_blink(long time) | |
| { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Returns how long it waited in ms */ | |
| long (*panic_blink)(long time); | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_blink); | |
| /** | |
| * panic - halt the system | |
| * @fmt: The text string to print | |
| * | |
| * Display a message, then perform cleanups. | |
| * | |
| * This function never returns. | |
| */ | |
| NORET_TYPE void panic(const char * fmt, ...) | |
| { | |
| long i; | |
| static char buf[1024]; | |
| va_list args; | |
| #if defined(CONFIG_S390) | |
| unsigned long caller = (unsigned long) __builtin_return_address(0); | |
| #endif | |
| /* | |
| * It's possible to come here directly from a panic-assertion and not | |
| * have preempt disabled. Some functions called from here want | |
| * preempt to be disabled. No point enabling it later though... | |
| */ | |
| preempt_disable(); | |
| bust_spinlocks(1); | |
| va_start(args, fmt); | |
| vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); | |
| va_end(args); | |
| printk(KERN_EMERG "Kernel panic - not syncing: %s\n",buf); | |
| bust_spinlocks(0); | |
| /* | |
| * If we have crashed and we have a crash kernel loaded let it handle | |
| * everything else. | |
| * Do we want to call this before we try to display a message? | |
| */ | |
| crash_kexec(NULL); | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SMP | |
| /* | |
| * Note smp_send_stop is the usual smp shutdown function, which | |
| * unfortunately means it may not be hardened to work in a panic | |
| * situation. | |
| */ | |
| smp_send_stop(); | |
| #endif | |
| atomic_notifier_call_chain(&panic_notifier_list, 0, buf); | |
| if (!panic_blink) | |
| panic_blink = no_blink; | |
| if (panic_timeout > 0) { | |
| /* | |
| * Delay timeout seconds before rebooting the machine. | |
| * We can't use the "normal" timers since we just panicked.. | |
| */ | |
| printk(KERN_EMERG "Rebooting in %d seconds..",panic_timeout); | |
| for (i = 0; i < panic_timeout*1000; ) { | |
| touch_nmi_watchdog(); | |
| i += panic_blink(i); | |
| mdelay(1); | |
| i++; | |
| } | |
| /* This will not be a clean reboot, with everything | |
| * shutting down. But if there is a chance of | |
| * rebooting the system it will be rebooted. | |
| */ | |
| emergency_restart(); | |
| } | |
| #ifdef __sparc__ | |
| { | |
| extern int stop_a_enabled; | |
| /* Make sure the user can actually press Stop-A (L1-A) */ | |
| stop_a_enabled = 1; | |
| printk(KERN_EMERG "Press Stop-A (L1-A) to return to the boot prom\n"); | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| #if defined(CONFIG_S390) | |
| disabled_wait(caller); | |
| #endif | |
| local_irq_enable(); | |
| for (i = 0;;) { | |
| touch_softlockup_watchdog(); | |
| i += panic_blink(i); | |
| mdelay(1); | |
| i++; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic); | |
| /** | |
| * print_tainted - return a string to represent the kernel taint state. | |
| * | |
| * 'P' - Proprietary module has been loaded. | |
| * 'F' - Module has been forcibly loaded. | |
| * 'S' - SMP with CPUs not designed for SMP. | |
| * 'R' - User forced a module unload. | |
| * 'M' - System experienced a machine check exception. | |
| * 'B' - System has hit bad_page. | |
| * 'U' - Userspace-defined naughtiness. | |
| * | |
| * The string is overwritten by the next call to print_taint(). | |
| */ | |
| const char *print_tainted(void) | |
| { | |
| static char buf[20]; | |
| if (tainted) { | |
| snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Tainted: %c%c%c%c%c%c%c%c", | |
| tainted & TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE ? 'P' : 'G', | |
| tainted & TAINT_FORCED_MODULE ? 'F' : ' ', | |
| tainted & TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP ? 'S' : ' ', | |
| tainted & TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD ? 'R' : ' ', | |
| tainted & TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK ? 'M' : ' ', | |
| tainted & TAINT_BAD_PAGE ? 'B' : ' ', | |
| tainted & TAINT_USER ? 'U' : ' ', | |
| tainted & TAINT_DIE ? 'D' : ' '); | |
| } | |
| else | |
| snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Not tainted"); | |
| return(buf); | |
| } | |
| void add_taint(unsigned flag) | |
| { | |
| debug_locks = 0; /* can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore */ | |
| tainted |= flag; | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_taint); | |
| static int __init pause_on_oops_setup(char *str) | |
| { | |
| pause_on_oops = simple_strtoul(str, NULL, 0); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| __setup("pause_on_oops=", pause_on_oops_setup); | |
| static void spin_msec(int msecs) | |
| { | |
| int i; | |
| for (i = 0; i < msecs; i++) { | |
| touch_nmi_watchdog(); | |
| mdelay(1); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * It just happens that oops_enter() and oops_exit() are identically | |
| * implemented... | |
| */ | |
| static void do_oops_enter_exit(void) | |
| { | |
| unsigned long flags; | |
| static int spin_counter; | |
| if (!pause_on_oops) | |
| return; | |
| spin_lock_irqsave(&pause_on_oops_lock, flags); | |
| if (pause_on_oops_flag == 0) { | |
| /* This CPU may now print the oops message */ | |
| pause_on_oops_flag = 1; | |
| } else { | |
| /* We need to stall this CPU */ | |
| if (!spin_counter) { | |
| /* This CPU gets to do the counting */ | |
| spin_counter = pause_on_oops; | |
| do { | |
| spin_unlock(&pause_on_oops_lock); | |
| spin_msec(MSEC_PER_SEC); | |
| spin_lock(&pause_on_oops_lock); | |
| } while (--spin_counter); | |
| pause_on_oops_flag = 0; | |
| } else { | |
| /* This CPU waits for a different one */ | |
| while (spin_counter) { | |
| spin_unlock(&pause_on_oops_lock); | |
| spin_msec(1); | |
| spin_lock(&pause_on_oops_lock); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pause_on_oops_lock, flags); | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Return true if the calling CPU is allowed to print oops-related info. This | |
| * is a bit racy.. | |
| */ | |
| int oops_may_print(void) | |
| { | |
| return pause_on_oops_flag == 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Called when the architecture enters its oops handler, before it prints | |
| * anything. If this is the first CPU to oops, and it's oopsing the first time | |
| * then let it proceed. | |
| * | |
| * This is all enabled by the pause_on_oops kernel boot option. We do all this | |
| * to ensure that oopses don't scroll off the screen. It has the side-effect | |
| * of preventing later-oopsing CPUs from mucking up the display, too. | |
| * | |
| * It turns out that the CPU which is allowed to print ends up pausing for the | |
| * right duration, whereas all the other CPUs pause for twice as long: once in | |
| * oops_enter(), once in oops_exit(). | |
| */ | |
| void oops_enter(void) | |
| { | |
| debug_locks_off(); /* can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore */ | |
| do_oops_enter_exit(); | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * 64-bit random ID for oopses: | |
| */ | |
| static u64 oops_id; | |
| static int init_oops_id(void) | |
| { | |
| if (!oops_id) | |
| get_random_bytes(&oops_id, sizeof(oops_id)); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| late_initcall(init_oops_id); | |
| /* | |
| * Called when the architecture exits its oops handler, after printing | |
| * everything. | |
| */ | |
| void oops_exit(void) | |
| { | |
| do_oops_enter_exit(); | |
| init_oops_id(); | |
| printk(KERN_WARNING "---[ end trace %016llx ]---\n", | |
| (unsigned long long)oops_id); | |
| } | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR | |
| /* | |
| * Called when gcc's -fstack-protector feature is used, and | |
| * gcc detects corruption of the on-stack canary value | |
| */ | |
| void __stack_chk_fail(void) | |
| { | |
| panic("stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted"); | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_fail); | |
| #endif |