fs/coredump: prevent fsuid=0 dumps into user-controlled directories This commit fixes the following security hole affecting systems where all of the following conditions are fulfilled: - The fs.suid_dumpable sysctl is set to 2. - The kernel.core_pattern sysctl's value starts with "/". (Systems where kernel.core_pattern starts with "|/" are not affected.) - Unprivileged user namespace creation is permitted. (This is true on Linux >=3.8, but some distributions disallow it by default using a distro patch.) Under these conditions, if a program executes under secure exec rules, causing it to run with the SUID_DUMP_ROOT flag, then unshares its user namespace, changes its root directory and crashes, the coredump will be written using fsuid=0 and a path derived from kernel.core_pattern - but this path is interpreted relative to the root directory of the process, allowing the attacker to control where a coredump will be written with root privileges. To fix the security issue, always interpret core_pattern for dumps that are written under SUID_DUMP_ROOT relative to the root directory of init. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/arch/um/drivers/mconsole_kern.c b/arch/um/drivers/mconsole_kern.c index b821b13..8a6b571 100644 --- a/arch/um/drivers/mconsole_kern.c +++ b/arch/um/drivers/mconsole_kern.c
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ ptr += strlen("proc"); ptr = skip_spaces(ptr); - file = file_open_root(mnt->mnt_root, mnt, ptr, O_RDONLY); + file = file_open_root(mnt->mnt_root, mnt, ptr, O_RDONLY, 0); if (IS_ERR(file)) { mconsole_reply(req, "Failed to open file", 1, 0); printk(KERN_ERR "open /proc/%s: %ld\n", ptr, PTR_ERR(file));
diff --git a/fs/coredump.c b/fs/coredump.c index 9ea87e9..47c32c3 100644 --- a/fs/coredump.c +++ b/fs/coredump.c
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h> #include <linux/oom.h> #include <linux/compat.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/path.h> #include <linux/timekeeping.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> @@ -649,6 +652,8 @@ } } else { struct inode *inode; + int open_flags = O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_NOFOLLOW | + O_LARGEFILE | O_EXCL; if (cprm.limit < binfmt->min_coredump) goto fail_unlock; @@ -687,10 +692,27 @@ * what matters is that at least one of the two processes * writes its coredump successfully, not which one. */ - cprm.file = filp_open(cn.corename, - O_CREAT | 2 | O_NOFOLLOW | - O_LARGEFILE | O_EXCL, - 0600); + if (need_suid_safe) { + /* + * Using user namespaces, normal user tasks can change + * their current->fs->root to point to arbitrary + * directories. Since the intention of the "only dump + * with a fully qualified path" rule is to control where + * coredumps may be placed using root privileges, + * current->fs->root must not be used. Instead, use the + * root directory of init_task. + */ + struct path root; + + task_lock(&init_task); + get_fs_root(init_task.fs, &root); + task_unlock(&init_task); + cprm.file = file_open_root(root.dentry, root.mnt, + cn.corename, open_flags, 0600); + path_put(&root); + } else { + cprm.file = filp_open(cn.corename, open_flags, 0600); + } if (IS_ERR(cprm.file)) goto fail_unlock;
diff --git a/fs/fhandle.c b/fs/fhandle.c index d59712d..ca3c3dd 100644 --- a/fs/fhandle.c +++ b/fs/fhandle.c
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ path_put(&path); return fd; } - file = file_open_root(path.dentry, path.mnt, "", open_flag); + file = file_open_root(path.dentry, path.mnt, "", open_flag, 0); if (IS_ERR(file)) { put_unused_fd(fd); retval = PTR_ERR(file);
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c index 55bdc75..17cb6b1 100644 --- a/fs/open.c +++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -992,14 +992,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(filp_open); struct file *file_open_root(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, - const char *filename, int flags) + const char *filename, int flags, umode_t mode) { struct open_flags op; - int err = build_open_flags(flags, 0, &op); + int err = build_open_flags(flags, mode, &op); if (err) return ERR_PTR(err); - if (flags & O_CREAT) - return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); return do_file_open_root(dentry, mnt, filename, &op); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_open_root);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index 35d9926..14a9719 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2263,7 +2263,7 @@ extern struct file *file_open_name(struct filename *, int, umode_t); extern struct file *filp_open(const char *, int, umode_t); extern struct file *file_open_root(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, - const char *, int); + const char *, int, umode_t); extern struct file * dentry_open(const struct path *, int, const struct cred *); extern int filp_close(struct file *, fl_owner_t id);
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl_binary.c b/kernel/sysctl_binary.c index 7e7746a..10a1d7d 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl_binary.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl_binary.c
@@ -1321,7 +1321,7 @@ } mnt = task_active_pid_ns(current)->proc_mnt; - file = file_open_root(mnt->mnt_root, mnt, pathname, flags); + file = file_open_root(mnt->mnt_root, mnt, pathname, flags, 0); result = PTR_ERR(file); if (IS_ERR(file)) goto out_putname;