| /* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o and root_plug.o | |
| * | |
| * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
| * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | |
| * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or | |
| * (at your option) any later version. | |
| * | |
| */ | |
| #include <linux/capability.h> | |
| #include <linux/module.h> | |
| #include <linux/init.h> | |
| #include <linux/kernel.h> | |
| #include <linux/security.h> | |
| #include <linux/file.h> | |
| #include <linux/mm.h> | |
| #include <linux/mman.h> | |
| #include <linux/pagemap.h> | |
| #include <linux/swap.h> | |
| #include <linux/skbuff.h> | |
| #include <linux/netlink.h> | |
| #include <linux/ptrace.h> | |
| #include <linux/xattr.h> | |
| #include <linux/hugetlb.h> | |
| #include <linux/mount.h> | |
| #include <linux/sched.h> | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES | |
| /* | |
| * Because of the reduced scope of CAP_SETPCAP when filesystem | |
| * capabilities are in effect, it is safe to allow this capability to | |
| * be available in the default configuration. | |
| */ | |
| # define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_FULL_SET | |
| #else /* ie. ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */ | |
| # define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_INIT_EFF_SET | |
| #endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */ | |
| kernel_cap_t cap_bset = CAP_INIT_BSET; /* systemwide capability bound */ | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bset); | |
| /* Global security state */ | |
| unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */ | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(securebits); | |
| int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) | |
| { | |
| NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current->cap_effective; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap) | |
| { | |
| if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, cap)) | |
| return -EPERM; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv); | |
| /* | |
| * NOTE WELL: cap_capable() cannot be used like the kernel's capable() | |
| * function. That is, it has the reverse semantics: cap_capable() | |
| * returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable() | |
| * returns 1 for this case. | |
| */ | |
| int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) | |
| { | |
| /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */ | |
| if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap)) | |
| return 0; | |
| return -EPERM; | |
| } | |
| int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz) | |
| { | |
| if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME)) | |
| return -EPERM; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int cap_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child) | |
| { | |
| /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */ | |
| if (!cap_issubset(child->cap_permitted, parent->cap_permitted) && | |
| !__capable(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) | |
| return -EPERM; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
| kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
| { | |
| /* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */ | |
| *effective = cap_t (target->cap_effective); | |
| *inheritable = cap_t (target->cap_inheritable); | |
| *permitted = cap_t (target->cap_permitted); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES | |
| static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *target) | |
| { | |
| /* | |
| * No support for remote process capability manipulation with | |
| * filesystem capability support. | |
| */ | |
| return (target != current); | |
| } | |
| static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) | |
| { | |
| /* | |
| * Return 1 if changes to the inheritable set are limited | |
| * to the old permitted set. That is, if the current task | |
| * does *not* possess the CAP_SETPCAP capability. | |
| */ | |
| return (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0); | |
| } | |
| #else /* ie., ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */ | |
| static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *t) { return 0; } | |
| static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) { return 1; } | |
| #endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */ | |
| int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
| kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
| { | |
| if (cap_block_setpcap(target)) { | |
| return -EPERM; | |
| } | |
| if (cap_inh_is_capped() | |
| && !cap_issubset(*inheritable, | |
| cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable, | |
| current->cap_permitted))) { | |
| /* incapable of using this inheritable set */ | |
| return -EPERM; | |
| } | |
| /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */ | |
| if (!cap_issubset (*permitted, | |
| cap_combine (target->cap_permitted, | |
| current->cap_permitted))) { | |
| return -EPERM; | |
| } | |
| /* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */ | |
| if (!cap_issubset (*effective, *permitted)) { | |
| return -EPERM; | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
| kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
| { | |
| target->cap_effective = *effective; | |
| target->cap_inheritable = *inheritable; | |
| target->cap_permitted = *permitted; | |
| } | |
| static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| cap_clear(bprm->cap_inheritable); | |
| cap_clear(bprm->cap_permitted); | |
| bprm->cap_effective = false; | |
| } | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES | |
| int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) | |
| { | |
| struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
| int error; | |
| if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr) | |
| return 0; | |
| error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0); | |
| if (error <= 0) | |
| return 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) | |
| { | |
| struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
| if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->removexattr) | |
| return 0; | |
| return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS); | |
| } | |
| static inline int cap_from_disk(struct vfs_cap_data *caps, | |
| struct linux_binprm *bprm, | |
| int size) | |
| { | |
| __u32 magic_etc; | |
| if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ) | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps->magic_etc); | |
| switch ((magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)) { | |
| case VFS_CAP_REVISION: | |
| if (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) | |
| bprm->cap_effective = true; | |
| else | |
| bprm->cap_effective = false; | |
| bprm->cap_permitted = to_cap_t(le32_to_cpu(caps->permitted)); | |
| bprm->cap_inheritable = to_cap_t(le32_to_cpu(caps->inheritable)); | |
| return 0; | |
| default: | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Locate any VFS capabilities: */ | |
| static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| struct dentry *dentry; | |
| int rc = 0; | |
| struct vfs_cap_data incaps; | |
| struct inode *inode; | |
| if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) { | |
| bprm_clear_caps(bprm); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry); | |
| inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
| if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr) | |
| goto out; | |
| rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0); | |
| if (rc > 0) { | |
| if (rc == XATTR_CAPS_SZ) | |
| rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, | |
| &incaps, XATTR_CAPS_SZ); | |
| else | |
| rc = -EINVAL; | |
| } | |
| if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { | |
| /* no data, that's ok */ | |
| rc = 0; | |
| goto out; | |
| } | |
| if (rc < 0) | |
| goto out; | |
| rc = cap_from_disk(&incaps, bprm, rc); | |
| if (rc) | |
| printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n", | |
| __FUNCTION__, rc, bprm->filename); | |
| out: | |
| dput(dentry); | |
| if (rc) | |
| bprm_clear_caps(bprm); | |
| return rc; | |
| } | |
| #else | |
| int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) | |
| { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) | |
| { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| static inline int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| bprm_clear_caps(bprm); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| int ret; | |
| ret = get_file_caps(bprm); | |
| if (ret) | |
| printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_file_caps returned %d for %s\n", | |
| __FUNCTION__, ret, bprm->filename); | |
| /* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root | |
| * executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three | |
| * capability sets for the file. | |
| * | |
| * If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable | |
| * and permitted sets of the executable file. | |
| */ | |
| if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) { | |
| if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) { | |
| cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable); | |
| cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted); | |
| } | |
| if (bprm->e_uid == 0) | |
| bprm->cap_effective = true; | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) | |
| { | |
| /* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */ | |
| kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working; | |
| new_permitted = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted, cap_bset); | |
| working = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_inheritable, | |
| current->cap_inheritable); | |
| new_permitted = cap_combine (new_permitted, working); | |
| if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid || | |
| !cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) { | |
| set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); | |
| current->pdeath_signal = 0; | |
| if (unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) { | |
| if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) { | |
| bprm->e_uid = current->uid; | |
| bprm->e_gid = current->gid; | |
| } | |
| if (!capable (CAP_SETPCAP)) { | |
| new_permitted = cap_intersect (new_permitted, | |
| current->cap_permitted); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; | |
| current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; | |
| /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set | |
| * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual | |
| * capability rules */ | |
| if (!is_global_init(current)) { | |
| current->cap_permitted = new_permitted; | |
| current->cap_effective = bprm->cap_effective ? | |
| new_permitted : 0; | |
| } | |
| /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */ | |
| current->keep_capabilities = 0; | |
| } | |
| int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| if (current->uid != 0) { | |
| if (bprm->cap_effective) | |
| return 1; | |
| if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_permitted)) | |
| return 1; | |
| if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_inheritable)) | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| return (current->euid != current->uid || | |
| current->egid != current->gid); | |
| } | |
| int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, | |
| size_t size, int flags) | |
| { | |
| if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) { | |
| if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP)) | |
| return -EPERM; | |
| return 0; | |
| } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, | |
| sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) && | |
| !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) | |
| return -EPERM; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name) | |
| { | |
| if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) { | |
| if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP)) | |
| return -EPERM; | |
| return 0; | |
| } else if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, | |
| sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) && | |
| !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) | |
| return -EPERM; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* moved from kernel/sys.c. */ | |
| /* | |
| * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of | |
| * a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid. | |
| * | |
| * 1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of | |
| * {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are | |
| * cleared. | |
| * | |
| * 2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective | |
| * capabilities of the process are cleared. | |
| * | |
| * 3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective | |
| * capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities. | |
| * | |
| * fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should | |
| * never happen. | |
| * | |
| * -astor | |
| * | |
| * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99 | |
| * A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it | |
| * calls setuid() and switches away from uid==0. Both permitted and | |
| * effective sets will be retained. | |
| * Without this change, it was impossible for a daemon to drop only some | |
| * of its privilege. The call to setuid(!=0) would drop all privileges! | |
| * Keeping uid 0 is not an option because uid 0 owns too many vital | |
| * files.. | |
| * Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this. | |
| */ | |
| static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid (int old_ruid, int old_euid, | |
| int old_suid) | |
| { | |
| if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) && | |
| (current->uid != 0 && current->euid != 0 && current->suid != 0) && | |
| !current->keep_capabilities) { | |
| cap_clear (current->cap_permitted); | |
| cap_clear (current->cap_effective); | |
| } | |
| if (old_euid == 0 && current->euid != 0) { | |
| cap_clear (current->cap_effective); | |
| } | |
| if (old_euid != 0 && current->euid == 0) { | |
| current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, | |
| int flags) | |
| { | |
| switch (flags) { | |
| case LSM_SETID_RE: | |
| case LSM_SETID_ID: | |
| case LSM_SETID_RES: | |
| /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setreuid/setuid/setresuid. */ | |
| if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) { | |
| cap_emulate_setxuid (old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid); | |
| } | |
| break; | |
| case LSM_SETID_FS: | |
| { | |
| uid_t old_fsuid = old_ruid; | |
| /* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setfsuid. */ | |
| /* | |
| * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities? | |
| * if not, we might be a bit too harsh here. | |
| */ | |
| if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) { | |
| if (old_fsuid == 0 && current->fsuid != 0) { | |
| cap_t (current->cap_effective) &= | |
| ~CAP_FS_MASK; | |
| } | |
| if (old_fsuid != 0 && current->fsuid == 0) { | |
| cap_t (current->cap_effective) |= | |
| (cap_t (current->cap_permitted) & | |
| CAP_FS_MASK); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| default: | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES | |
| /* | |
| * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and | |
| * task_setnice, assumes that | |
| * . if capable(cap_sys_nice), then those actions should be allowed | |
| * . if not capable(cap_sys_nice), but acting on your own processes, | |
| * then those actions should be allowed | |
| * This is insufficient now since you can call code without suid, but | |
| * yet with increased caps. | |
| * So we check for increased caps on the target process. | |
| */ | |
| static inline int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p) | |
| { | |
| if (!cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) && | |
| !__capable(current, CAP_SYS_NICE)) | |
| return -EPERM; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, | |
| struct sched_param *lp) | |
| { | |
| return cap_safe_nice(p); | |
| } | |
| int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) | |
| { | |
| return cap_safe_nice(p); | |
| } | |
| int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice) | |
| { | |
| return cap_safe_nice(p); | |
| } | |
| int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, | |
| int sig, u32 secid) | |
| { | |
| if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info))) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* | |
| * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities. | |
| * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously | |
| * allowed. | |
| * We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case. | |
| */ | |
| if (p->euid == 0 && p->uid == current->uid) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* sigcont is permitted within same session */ | |
| if (sig == SIGCONT && (task_session_nr(current) == task_session_nr(p))) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (secid) | |
| /* | |
| * Signal sent as a particular user. | |
| * Capabilities are ignored. May be wrong, but it's the | |
| * only thing we can do at the moment. | |
| * Used only by usb drivers? | |
| */ | |
| return 0; | |
| if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (capable(CAP_KILL)) | |
| return 0; | |
| return -EPERM; | |
| } | |
| #else | |
| int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, | |
| struct sched_param *lp) | |
| { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) | |
| { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice) | |
| { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, | |
| int sig, u32 secid) | |
| { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p) | |
| { | |
| p->cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET; | |
| p->cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET; | |
| p->cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET; | |
| p->keep_capabilities = 0; | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| int cap_syslog (int type) | |
| { | |
| if ((type != 3 && type != 10) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) | |
| return -EPERM; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) | |
| { | |
| int cap_sys_admin = 0; | |
| if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) | |
| cap_sys_admin = 1; | |
| return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); | |
| } | |