tree 312545b1f84f43d8cb8aba2168a8ad32eac09cb8
parent c21a6970ae727839a2f300cd8dd957de0d0238c3
author Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> 1523403326 -0700
committer Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> 1523467717 -0700

ipc/sem: introduce semctl(SEM_STAT_ANY)

There is a permission discrepancy when consulting shm ipc object
metadata between /proc/sysvipc/sem (0444) and the SEM_STAT semctl
command.  The later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO.
As such there can be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the
info is displayed anyways in the procfs files.

While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the sma metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing
all the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an
overlook - so we are stuck with it.  Furthermore, modifying either the
syscall or the procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie
ipcs).  Some applications require getting the procfs info (without root
privileges) and can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to
500x in some reported cases for shm.

This patch introduces a new SEM_STAT_ANY command such that the sem ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead.  In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-3-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>