squashfs: be more careful about metadata corruption
Anatoly Trosinenko reports that a corrupted squashfs image can cause a
kernel oops. It turns out that squashfs can end up being confused about
negative fragment lengths.
The regular squashfs_read_data() does check for negative lengths, but
squashfs_read_metadata() did not, and the fragment size code just
blindly trusted the on-disk value. Fix both the fragment parsing and
the metadata reading code.
Reported-by: Anatoly Trosinenko <anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/fs/squashfs/cache.c b/fs/squashfs/cache.c
index 23813c0..0839efa 100644
--- a/fs/squashfs/cache.c
+++ b/fs/squashfs/cache.c
@@ -350,6 +350,9 @@ int squashfs_read_metadata(struct super_block *sb, void *buffer,
TRACE("Entered squashfs_read_metadata [%llx:%x]\n", *block, *offset);
+ if (unlikely(length < 0))
+ return -EIO;
+
while (length) {
entry = squashfs_cache_get(sb, msblk->block_cache, *block, 0);
if (entry->error) {
